Darknets are increasingly being proposed as a means by which network administrators can monitor for anomalous, externally sourced traffic. Current darknet designs require large, contiguous blocks of unused IP addresses -not always feasible for enterprise network operators. In this paper we introduce, define and evaluate the concept of a Greynet -a region of IP address space that is sparsely populated with 'darknet' addresses interspersed with active (or 'lit') IP addresses. We use raw traffic traces collected within a university network to evaluate how sparseness affects a greynet's effectiveness and hence show that enterprise operators can achieve useful levels of network scan detection, with only small numbers of 'dark' IP addresses making up their greynets.
Introduction
Darknets have become reasonably well known over the past few years as a technique for identifying unexpected and/or unsolicited network traffic. The key underlying principle is: a large block of unusedyet-valid IP addresses are monitored for inbound IP packets and inferences are drawn from the packets that eventually arrive. Darknets are referred to as being 'dark' because they consist of IP addresses that have no legitimate associated activity. Packets can arrive at darknet addresses (because the IP addresses making up a darknet are valid and routable) but no packets are ever emitted from darknet addresses. Darknets are passive collectors of packets.
Packets arriving at darknet addresses generally represent either misconfiguration of hosts outside the darknet, backscatter from network attacks targeted elsewhere on the Internet, or probes/scans by hosts that are speculatively mapping the darknet itself. Regardless of their motives, the sources usually do not realise they are sending packets into a monitored darknet space. Systems using darknet techniques have been called network telescopes [1] [2], internet motion sensors [3] [4] and black holes [5] . Despite different names and implementation goals, they are at heart the same concept.
By alerting us to unsolicited network-scanning activity, darknets can play an extremely useful part in broader intrusion detection systems and systems for detecting the existence of virus-infected PCs. Darknets themselves are fairly easy to build, requiring only a low-end PC and a free, open-source unix-like operating system (such as FreeBSD or a Linux variant). However, many darknet deployments have assumed that large, unused blocks of contiguous IP addresses are available -at least a /24, and more typically a /16 or larger. Not a hard requirement to meet for Internet service providers (ISPs) or research networks, but problematic for many enterprise networks and smaller ISPs.
It is our belief that enterprise-level darknets should be developed not requiring large, contiguous blocks of free IP addresses. In practice, enterprise networks are more likely to have scattered blocks of free IP addresses (perhaps four, eight or more at a time) or simply have individual IP addresses scattered amongst active addresses.
To address this area we introduce the concept of a greynet -that is, a region of network address space that is sparsely populated with 'darknet' addresses. (An alternative term would be 'sparse darknet', but we feel that greynet is easier to use in both conversational and written form.) This paper has two primary goals: 1. To introduce a set of terminology for classifying and describing greynets. 2. To demonstrate an analysis of real-world data to show the efficacy of greynets under different degrees of sparseness. In doing so, we show that useful intrusion and virus-scan detection systems can be built in and around operational IP address space, using only small numbers of 'dark' addresses and hope to inspire further design and development of greynet-based systems. (An explicit non-goal of this paper is to avoid re-hashing descriptions of particular scan patterns others have seen using darknets.) This paper continues in section 2 with an introduction to darknets. Section 3 then defines and characterises greynets. In section 4 we introduce our experimental implementation and present results in section 5. Implementation considerations are discussed in section 6 before we conclude in section 7.
Background
Intrusion detection systems do not require darknets to be effective -examples such as Bro [6] [7] monitor traffic at central points in a network and use signature analysis of observed traffic flows between active IP addresses to identify likely intrusion candidates. What darknets add, is the ability to detect speculative network scanning, without complex signature analysis, by making the following simplifying assumption -no packet should be heading towards a darknet IP address.
Mis-configured clients (or higher-layer errors, such as mistyped URLs) do cause a level of inbound traffic that is harmless. However, a significant number of packets are scans by other hosts attempting to locate hosts and services to infect through known exploits. Armed with this knowledge, darknet logs can be analysed to reveal information about potential and on-going network attacks or virus infections.
Previous work
Much previous darknet research has been for the purpose of accurately inferring wider Internet activity
To accurately predict wider Internet activity the darknet is typically made as large as possible (similar to the building of larger and larger optical and radio telescopes to increase resolution in regular astronomy). Infection vectors and possible attacks, may be inferred from scan patterns. Denial of service attack activity can be inferred from Internet back scatter [9] .
Of the large darknet projects, the Internet Motion Sensor (IMS) [3] [4] is attempting the accurate detection of wider Internet activity, using a distribution of darknets, both large and small, around the entire Internet space. Within the IMS project, the smallest atomic components making up the distributed darknet are /24 networks.
In regard to the analysis and interpretation of darknet data, the 'spinning cube of potential doom' [10] [11] is worth special mention as a unique method developed for the visualisation of darknet data. By representing darknet space as a three dimensional cube, scans reveal themselves by the patterns they form, easily recognisable by the human observer.
There is currently investigation in the area of small darknet deployments and their effectiveness in a LAN context such as [12] . This research is focused on creating effective methods to allow small darknets to report zero day worms, as quickly as possible, based on scanning patterns.
Enterprise and campus darknets
Internal, small scale darknets are of value to enterprise network operators because they can provide an early warning of internal hosts launching hostile scans against other parts of the enterprise network. Unlike networks run for research, enterprise networks are generally not concerned with detecting wider Internet activity unless it is threatening them directly. Internet backscatter is most likely of very little concern. Scans and probes originating externally are of a moderate concern, as the potential to infect is limited to hosts unprotected by the enterprise firewall (e.g. the enterprise's public servers). Scans and probes originating internally, however, are of grave concern as the code generating the scan has moved past the network's outer defenses. For this reason we focus on the development of deployable, sparsely allocated darknets that we call greynets.
Defining and characterising a greynet
Greynets are collections of non-contiguous blocks of IP addresses that are 'dark' in the classical darknet sense, but interspersed between groups of 'lit' IP addresses -active addresses belonging to real hosts on the enterprise network. Greynets might be the only possible way to deploy passive network monitoring in enterprise networks, due to a combination of IP address scarcity and allocation techniques (automated or manual) that lead to scattered clusters of allocated and unallocated addresses. Additionally, interspersing 'darknet' addresses among valid hosts within subnets, in a sense hides the passive sensors, making it harder for malware (such as self-propagating viruses) to avoid hitting a greynet address while it searches for infection targets.
In order to methodically evaluate the efficacy of greynets we first introduce a set of terminology.
Terms and definitions
Greynet: A mixture of 'lit' (used) and 'dark' (unused) IP address space in a particular IP subnetwork.
Potentials: 'P', the set of 'dark' IP addresses that may potentially be monitored and are otherwise unused. The symbol 'Pm' represents a set of Potentials covering m actual (but not necessarily contiguous) IP addresses. Pm is a subset of all addresses making up a greynet. Listeners: 'L', the set of 'dark' IP addresses that are being monitored. 'Ln' represents the set of n listeners, where Ln <= Pm (i.e. n <= m and Ln is a subset of Pm, and there are never members of Ln outside Pm). A greynet may well have Ln < Pm, a sparse darknet.
External traffic sources from outside P are visualised as point sources at the centre of the circle sending probe packets towards points on the circumference. The greynet 'sees' those packets that head towards points that are members of Ln. Figure 1 shows this relationship.
Ln may be distributed throughout P in a number of ways. Two obvious possibilities are a block of n contiguous addresses (which we shall call type A) or n addresses spaced uniformly around the circumference of P (which we shall call type B).
This notation now means we can describe both the number of listeners and their layout within a greynet. E.g. L5A represents "5 listeners in a contiguous block" while L10B is "10 listeners spread uniformly". In general 'LnX' represents n listeners in distribution style X across the space P.
Orientation of listeners: Finally, we define a particular distribution of listeners, LnX, as having a rotational orientation relative to P called θ. The position and distribution of a set of listeners within P can thus be fully described by a form of polar coordinate (LnX,θ). We recognise that some combinations of Type B distributions, 'n' and 'θ' are redundant. For example, in Figure 2 θ=0 and θ=90 degrees create identically distributed sets of listeners.
Establishing the efficacy of a Greynet
Clearly the use of sparse and non-contiguous sets of IP addresses reduces the ability of a greynet to 'see' network scans and other classes of inbound traffic. With the preceding terminology we can now define testable performance goals for particular types of greynets. For each type (in our case types A and B) we wish to evaluate two things: how small we can make Ln while still seeing intrusion traffic 'quickly enough' and how our intrusion detection depends on the orientation of the listener set Ln.
First we define inbound 'events'. In general an event represents one or more packets coming from an external entity, making a particular pass at hosts inside the greynet. Since the destination TCP or UDP port is usually indicative of particular types of probes and scans, we wild-card the destination address when searching for packets to indicate the start of an event. For TCP traffic we define an event as occurring when the first TCP SYN packet arrives to any destination in Ln, bound for a fixed port. (Repeated TCP SYN packets over subsequent seconds are ignored. They represent the remote attacker's operating system retrying the same connection event because the greynet target is not answering.) TCP events associated with virus propagation attempts usually have valid source addresses, since the attacker is looking to establish a valid connection. For UDP traffic an event occurs when a UDP packet arrives for any destination in Ln, for a fixed port. Temporally related UDP packets may belong to the same 'event' even if their source addresses differ. One example is unidirectional UDPbased spam to the Winpopup service port, where no response is required from the target host. Bursts of UDP packets arrive clustered in time, but with randomised source addresses and destination addresses that 'walk' across the greynet. In such a case we might infer a common source by looking for UDP packets whose payloads (the spam message itself) are highly correlated.
With events defined, we now define two measurable metrics -median inter-event interval, and 'time to detect' (TTD). The former reflects the median time between seeing an inbound event for a particular (LnX,θ). The latter (TTD) reflects the time difference between a full darknet (Ln == Pm ) seeing a particular inbound event and when a sparser greynet of listeners (LnX,θ) would see an equivalent event. Figure 3 illustrates these two metrics.
We would like to show how median inter-event intervals and TTD vary as a function of greynet sparseness and orientation and thereby characterise the efficacy of particular greynet structures. Although this could have been achieved by simulation, we chose to analyse data gathered experimentally from a live darknet, filtering out different parts of the dataset to simulate what various types of greynet would have received.
Our experimental implementation
Our experimental greynet was a /24 subnet open to both the Internet and the university campus network (a hole explicitly punched through the university firewall). We established a FreeBSD 4.10 box with 238 'dark' IP addresses aliased to a single ethernet interface and used tcpdump to gather data from midJune to late September 2004. FreeBSD was configured with all services shut off and its internal firewall set to block all outbound packets, ensuring the host would be passive. (Due to our university network structure only x.y.z.16 to x.y.z.254 were available on the x.y.z/24 subnet, hence Pm was limited to 238 addresses.)
Results
It is important to recognise the apparent efficacy of a greynet depends as much on the inbound scan patterns as on the greynet's own structure itself, so the following results should primarily be taken as an indication of how median inter-event intervals and TTD plots may be generated and used. Table 1 summarises the total TCP, UDP and ICMP traffic seen inbound to our greynet host. The internal and external categories reflect traffic from within the university's /16 network and from the wider Internet respectively. As a side-effect of internal university filtering, no UDP packets were received from internal sources. (Interestingly enough, there was one additional packet seen externally not TCP, UDP or ICMP -a lone RSVP PATH message arrived for no apparent reason one day.) Due to certain malware infections on our campus roughly 96.8% of internally sourced traffic were probes to TCP port 445 across the greynet space. These results are not unexpected [13] . A number of self-propagating worms and viruses use the theory that IP address blocks topologically close, are also likely to be geographically close, connected by higher speed links and/or running the same exploitable operating system (relative to target addresses that are topologically distant). It also makes sense for selfpropagation to be attempted more aggressively against 'nearer' hosts than against 'distant' hosts. For this reason an internal, enterprise greynet is likely to prove highly valuable.
Overall statistics
Of the external UDP data collected, the vast majority (99%) consisted of UDP packets destined for ports 1026, 1027, 1028 and 1029. These packets arrived in bursts that scanned across our greynet's address space, but carried randomised source IP addresses. The temporal correlation of the inbound packets and their incrementing destination addresses, suggest the source addresses were forged. However, it is unlikely the perpetrators wished a reply, as these packets were attempting to get a 'popup' window containing a message to appear on Microsoft Windows hosts. Investigation of the payload of these packets revealed that 62% of the messages were trying to convince users to access a web site for a fraudulent Windows update, 24% were advertisements for some form of male genitalia enlargement process and 1.3% were advertising "Prestigous (sic) non accredited degrees".
Type A greynet and Host 174
A number of campus connected hosts remained infected with malware for the entire period of measurement. One such host was x.y.107.174, subsequently referred to as host 174. Figure 4 shows the distribution LnA, ie n number of listeners, in a contiguous group, as a series of box plots with θ=0. The group of n IP addresses making up the greynet (LnX,θ=0) always start at the 'beginning' (x.y.z.16) of the darknet IP address space (Pm).
As n, the number of listeners increases, the time taken for packets to be 'seen' by the enlarging darknet decreases.
If any bias exists in the scans, they will not be shown by Figure 4 . To view any bias, Figure 5 includes θ, the discrete rotation of each Ln group through all possible Pm.
The symmetry along the theta axis shows greynet performance independent of θ orientation for this particular malware scan. eg. If an L40A IP address set is created, any placement within Pm will yield the same median detector results.
Type B greynet and Host 174
Host 174's scans were also analysed simulating a 'B' type darknet ie, an evenly spaced Ln addresses across Pm. Very similar to the type A results we can see from Figure 6 that for this particular type of scan traffic we see no advantage from grouping (type A) or spreading evenly (type B) our listeners across the greynet.
Externally sourced TCP connection attempts
As noted earlier, the TTD depends on both the scan distribution and the listener distribution. In particular, a type B greynet will usually detect linear address scans quite quickly, since the listeners Ln are spread evenly over the available set Pm. Figure 7 shows a clear example of this phenomenon when our greynet faces linear TCP connection-attempt scans from external sources, with an estimated median TTD under 2.5 seconds for all values of θ. When n=1 the TTD plot also reveals that this particular connection-attempt scan begins at the bottom of our greynet (x.w.z.16) and works its way upwards. This can be seen in the way TTD increases noticeably with θ (placing the sole listener further away from the 'bottom' of the greynet as θ increases). For higher values of n (more listeners) the TTD drops quickly below 0.5 seconds, and for n > 48 the TTD is close to zero. This suggests only a handful of listeners spread across an enterprise subnet will reveal the presence of linear connection-scans relatively quickly.
The absolute TTD values in Figure 7 are not our primary interest, being a consequence of the external host scanning across our greynet in only a few seconds. Absolute TTD would naturally increase if the remote host scanned more slowly across greynet space. However, the relationship between TTD and θ (particularly for n=1) always reveals the direction and linearity (or randomness) of the scan sequence across the greynet. (If the connect-attempt scans jumped randomly around the greynet space, the TTD would be relatively independent of θ, even for n=1.) We should also note that as n increases there is a smaller and smaller range of θ that produces distinct distributions of listeners. For the sake of visual simplicity we plotted Figure 7 across a wide range of θ despite the redundancy.
Although not shown due to space constraints, we saw similar TTD results when analysing a type B greynet against UDP and ICMP probe traffic of external origin.
Implementation Considerations
There are two interesting implementation issues that arise from our model of greynets for enterprises.
Firstly, many enterprise networks utilise DHCP for assignment and management of 'live' IP addresses. Clearly the dynamic assignment and re-assignment of IP addresses would conflict with a greynet's set of potential listeners, Pm. There are two solution pathseither the greynet proactively requests a set of DHCP assigned addresses for its own use (removing them from circulation, but fixing Pm to a known size), or the greynet and DHCP server are integrated such that Pm is always equal to the DHCP server's pool of unallocated addresses at any given time.
Secondly, the use of VLANs by many large enterprise networks makes it relatively easy to implement a greynet that crosses subnet boundaries (so Pm need not be restricted to a single subnet). Consider the case where different IP subnets are carried by separate ethernet VLANs across an enterprise backbone. A single FreeBSD box attached to a backbone switch's trunk port could activate multiple concurrent vlan interfaces and give an onboard greynet application visibility into multiple subnets/VLANs at the same time. A single box could centrally monitor the entire enterprise network by configuring various (LnX,θ) permutations to sparsely span multiple VLANs.
Conclusion
We have introduced the concept of a greynet, a sparse distribution of 'dark' IP addresses interspersed between 'lit' (active) IP addresses. The greynet concept will be most attractive for enterprise networks who cannot afford large contiguous blocks of IP address space for regular darknets, but still wish to monitor 'dark' addresses in order to detect unsolicited network scans and probes.
We have introduced a set of terminology to classify and define various types of greynet structures -Potentials (Pm, the set of possible dark addresses), Listeners (Ln, dark addresses actually in-use by the greynet), distributions of Listeners (e.g. small contiguous blocks vs evenly spaced addresses) and 'angle' of the Listener distribution. We fully describe a particular greynet with (LnX,θ) notation.
A darknet with 238 addresses was operated for 3 months in 2004, collecting inbound probes and scans. With this real-world data we simulated the operation of greynets with less than 238 addresses and different address configurations. We demonstrated that two metrics, median inter-event interval and 'time to detect', provide a good tool for evaluating the efficacy of particular greynet configurations relative to different types of network scanning patterns.
Two examples stand out: -For our sasser infected hosts, such as 'host 174', we only need roughly 30 listeners to keep the median connection attempt interval under 200 seconds. For the purposes of identifying (and optionally isolating) infected hosts inside an enterprise network this is an excellent result.
-TCP scans that quickly move across the greynet space in a linear fashion are detected very quickly (low TTD) even with only small numbers of listeners. Clearly, as little as one listener alone will detect linear scans, in the worst case, in the time it takes to complete the scan. Our particular results from external sources showed median time to detect to be at worst 2.5 seconds.
We finished by noting how greynet implementations ought to be integrated into DHCP servers for maximum utility in networks based on DHCP for address assignment and how VLAN-based enterprise networks enable simple deployment of a single physical box that can instantiate a greynet spanning multiple IP subnets simultaneously.
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